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The new Greek government, led by Alexis Tsipras’ Syriza, has announced its intention to
renegotiate the repayment of the country’s debt. Aris Trantidis writes that while some limited
concessions may be possible, Syriza’s broader aims of encouraging Europe to adopt a diﬀerent
economic strategy will be far harder to achieve in the absence of any clear allies in other EU
countries.
The election of a new government in Greece led by the left-wing party Syriza brings to the political
stage a debate that has been taking place among economic experts and academics since the
outbreak of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. This is a debate between two contrasting paradigms on economic policy: on the
one side, the economically ‘orthodox’ approach, which is embedded in the institutional architecture of the EU and,
on the other, a ‘neo-Keynesian’ approach which has been revived and promoted by several economists.
A clash of paradigms and the Greek case
Economic ‘orthodoxy’ describes a set of economic and ﬁscal policies aiming at government budgetary discipline, low
inﬂation, supply-side growth and relatively tight monetary policy. These policies are often dubbed ‘neoliberal’. This is
a rather ill-deﬁned term, but it remains a pithy word in public debate. Orthodox economic prescriptions have been
followed by EU governments quite inconsistently (especially with regard to the level of taxation and the size of
government expenditure) but they largely set the tone in policy recommendations by European Union institutions. In
the aftermath of the crisis, these policy prescriptions were translated into a clear mandate of ﬁscal austerity and
deep-cutting structural reforms that was addressed to heavily indebted countries such as Greece. In this view, ﬁscal
stabilisation and structural reforms will help Greece stabilise its public ﬁnances and return to economic growth
through ensuing gains in competitiveness.
On the other side, hybrid versions of neo-Keynesianism such as the one we can trace in the US economic and ﬁscal
policies after 2008, have been proposed by several leading economists as part of the solution to the simmering
crisis most Western economies have been facing since 2009. They essentially reverse the arrow of causality
between ﬁscal consolidation and growth. In the neo-Keynesian approach causality moves from demand-led growth
to ﬁscal stabilisation thanks to a once again growing economy. The merits and perils of both the orthodox and the
neo-Keynesian approaches have been ﬁercely debated among economists and policy-makers.
Alexis Tsipras, Credit: subversive festival media (CC-BY-SA-3.0)
The Greek election result can be interpreted as a verdict against ‘orthodox’ economic policies implemented in the
country since 2010. Fiscal austerity in Greece was sharp and aimed at achieving a primary budget surplus in the
hope that the country would restore its capacity to borrow from private markets and would be able to leave the
European bailout mechanism, just as Ireland and Portugal eventually did. Greece was then expected to ‘restart’ its
economy with private investment mostly geared toward export-oriented activities.
Both ﬁscal adjustment and economic recovery were unsuccessful. The primary budget surplus was achieved mostly
through high taxes and hasty cuts in public spending. The rate of growth recorded for the ﬁrst time in ﬁve years was
anaemic and largely the result of a booming tourist season. Since the onset of the crisis Greece has lost almost a
third of its GDP, and has an unemployment rate of 30 per cent.
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The unprecedented scale of economic output contraction in Greece suggests that the policy remedy was not a
‘success story’ as the former Greek government
advertised it. The opponents of strict austerity have won
the domestic debate on the grounds that Greece’s dire
situation is largely the result of an ‘obsessive’ quest for
primary budget surpluses and the highly experimental
policy of internal devaluation of wages and assets that
was supposed to serve as a substitute for currency
devaluation. In this view, this policy mix reduced
domestic demand, shook the banking system and
undermined the conditions for investment and job
creation. In short, the economic ‘remedy’ applied in
Greece is killing the ‘patient’.
Greece as a case of policy failure strengthens those who
point to the risks of sharp austerity-driven economic
adjustment. Implementing rapid and deep-cutting
structural reforms may help restore growth in the long term, but sharp rises in taxation, for instance, or any form of
intervention to achieve high primary surpluses to serve a (primarily) external debt will lead to rapidly contracting
domestic demand, which aﬀects growth rates, unemployment levels and the state of public ﬁnances. The EU and
the IMF unrealistically expected Greece to achieve a pace of economic restructuring toward export-led growth
which no economy can meet without a long time lag and without experiencing a degree of social dislocation that is
politically unsustainable.
Syriza, Greece and the ﬁght against austerity policies
The question that arises from the Greek electorate’s verdict on economic policy is the following: how likely is it for
Greece to be the leading force behind a shift in the economic ideas underpinning EU policies?
In many respects, this is unlikely because there are multiple diagnoses of the crisis in the Eurozone. The quest for
the causes of the Eurozone crisis extends beyond Syriza’s narrative, while Greece is widely seen as a special case.
Part of Greece’s economic decline – and to some extent Europe’s stagnation – has been attributed to persistent
structural rigidities that existed prior to 2009. In Greece, local conditions played their role too. Decades of corrupt
government created a two-tier form of state-sponsored capitalism: on the one hand, blatant favouritism towards the
a small economic elite, the so-called ‘Greek oligarchs’ and an army of party supporters in key positions in public
administration; on the other, a hostile environment for entrepreneurs outside the circle of the political protégés, low-
paid key private and public sector employees and the unemployed.
The second reason why momentum for change is unlikely to be Europe-wide is that Syriza’s message – that ending
austerity and boosting domestic demand will combine together to restore sizeable growth rates in Europe – is
intrinsically linked to the Greek case for an EU agreement to restructure the country’s debt. This particular claim has
the support of world-renowned economists who believe that the Greek debt as it stands is not viable and that sharp
austerity measures needed to generate large surpluses in the future will continue to stiﬂe growth and
unemployment. But to gain broader support among a wider European audience, Syriza has to make a general case
appealing to all. At the moment, both the Greek-centred version of the argument and its call for an EU-wide
conference on European public debt, similar to the London Conference of 1953, have failed to entice countries who
lent money to Greece and do not see their debt as unsustainable.
Moreover, Syriza’s message for Europe does not clarify how competitiveness and growth will be restored in Greece
and in Europe. For domestic political and ideological reasons, Syriza has so far avoided addressing the question of
how to rectify the structural causes of Greek economic malaise. Previous Greek governments also shied away from
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implementing far-ranging structural reforms. Syriza’s political background does not prevent its government from
reforming the Greek public sector and the tax system, but it makes it politically costly to endorse in its policies labour
market liberalisation and privatisation, given the party’s electoral platform was based on staunch opposition to
structural reforms.
Second, for the general public in Europe, Syriza’s appeal is damaged by its popular portrayal in the European media
as an extreme left-wing party led by staunch Marxists, which borders on a caricature. Its message may also be
undermined by arguments which place ‘collective blame’ on the Greek people for ‘living beyond their means’. This is
a rather inconsistent accusation, since current levels of government debt (public and private) and budget deﬁcits in
many European countries are close to where Greece was in 2008. Still, a public discourse largely reproducing a
vindictive stereotype of Greek society as inherently dysfunctional can also serve as a ‘moral’ buﬀer against Syriza’s
attempt to lead an anti-austerity campaign across Europe.
A more solid argument is the so called ‘moral hazard’ of oﬀering debt relief to unreformed economies. For currently
sceptical EU governments this is also a matter of political consistency as Syriza’s position poses a direct challenge
to the economic policies they have now been following for a sustained period. EU governments even in countries
with troubled economies prefer not to identify themselves with the case of Greece.
Syriza has not yet forged strong alliances across Europe and it is less likely to do so in the near future. Fears of a
political ‘spill over’ eﬀect may also outweigh any desire to examine how sound Syriza’s case for debt relief actually
is. This political environment does not necessarily make it prohibitive for Greece to achieve better terms in the
repayment of its public debt. Most probably some concessions will be oﬀered after tough negotiations, but they will
not be celebrated as a change in Europe’s dominant economic paradigm.
Lack of a convincing ‘positive’ proposal
Even if Syriza manages to convey a moderate image and assuage these fears, the economic proposal it brings to
the table is vague and incoherent as it stands. It denounces privatisation in public utilities and infrastructure and
invokes neo-Keynesian arguments in ﬁscal policy, which are still a minority view in economics. In political terms, it
advocates ﬁscal policy relaxation and a return to a more active role of the state in the economy, which is a risky idea
if it means that the hands of governments in both the North and the South of Europe are left unrestrained against the
lure of ﬁscally proﬂigacy.
While Syriza’s proposal may not be seen as a convincing policy alternative for Europe as a whole, its criticism of
austerity may yet gain momentum. Recently, the new Greek ﬁnance minister, economist Yanis Varoufakis, launched
an attack on what he described as ‘pyramid austerity’ – austerity disproportionately targeting the economically
weaker segments of society. This critique could lead a Europe-wide debate on austerity with a pragmatic and
essentially political argument over what austerity costs in terms of social cohesion and political extremism. Syriza’s
alternative ‘moral’ argument cuts across national divides over fairness in economic adjustment in Europe: which
social groups must not bear most of its cost, and what happens if economic and political nationalism prevails
following a ‘collective blame’ narrative.
It is still uncertain whether Syriza’s victory will usher in a noticeable change of policy and new attitudes toward
economic recovery in Europe and beyond. The EU institutions have been designed to block attempts to radically
revise mainstream economic policies in Europe. But political developments do not always follow the relative strength
of economic ideas. The ECB’s recent decision to pursue quantitative easing indicates that nothing is set in stone.
Political developments are not determined by path-dependency. Like all complex systems, political systems are
dense networks of players whose local adaptations, even in response to a minor initial change (a trigger), may
generate network dynamics and a domino eﬀect of interactions that could lead to radical change.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
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Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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